



ADVANCED IDLE SCANNING

by Demetris Papapetrou




- Introduction to TCP/IP Networks
- Port Scanning Techniques
- Idle Scanning
- Advanced Idle Scanning
- Revealing Trust Relationships




INTRODUCTION TO TCP/IP NETWORKS

OSI 7 Layer Model



Encapsulation



IP Header



IP Header Format

Offsets	Octet	0								1								2								3							
Octet	Bit	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
0	0	Version				IHL				DSCP				ECN				Total Length															
4	32	Identification																Flags			Fragment Offset												
8	64	Time To Live								Protocol								Header Checksum															
12	96	Source IP Address																															
16	128	Destination IP Address																															
20	160	Options (if IHL > 5)																															

TCP Header



TCP Header Format

Offsets Octet		0								1								2								3							
Octet	Bit	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
0	0	Source port																Destination port															
4	32	Sequence number																															
8	64	Acknowledgment number (if ACK set)																															
12	96	Data offset				Reserved 0 0 0			N S	C W R	E C E	U R G	A C K	P C S	R S S	F Y I N	Window Size																
16	128	Checksum																Urgent pointer (if URG set)															
20	160	Options (if data offset > 5. Padded at the end with "0" bytes if necessary.)																															
...	...	...																															




- It is a technique to detect live hosts
- Pings are not 100% reliable
 - On LANs we can use ARP pings
- They use ICMP Echo Requests and Echo Replies
- They can be blocked by firewalls very easily


Ping Sweep



Host is up and
replies to Pings




Host is down or
Pings are blocked
by a Firewall





- It is a technique to trace the network nodes/hops that our packets traverse until they reach their destination
- A clever replacement of IP Record Route
- We usually send ICMP or UDP packets
 - Hackers use TCP as well
- And receive ICMP Time Exceeded in Transit messages
- They are used by hackers to map the target network
- To block them drop outbound ICMP Time Exceeded

Traceroute



Sample Traceroute Output



```
Command Prompt
C:\>tracert mediacollege.com

Tracing route to mediacollege.com [66.246.3.197]
over a maximum of 30 hops:

  1  <10 ms    <10 ms    <10 ms    192.168.1.1
  2  240 ms    421 ms    70 ms     219-88-164-1.jetstream.xtra.co.nz [219.88.164.1]
  3   20 ms     30 ms     30 ms     210.55.205.123
  4   *         *         *         Request timed out.
  5   30 ms     30 ms     40 ms     202.50.245.197
  6   30 ms     40 ms     40 ms     g2-0-3.tkbr3.global-gateway.net.nz [202.37.245.140]
  7   30 ms     30 ms     40 ms     so-1-2-1-0.akbr3.global-gateway.net.nz [202.50.116.161]
  8  160 ms    161 ms    160 ms     p1-3.sjbr1.global-gateway.net.nz [202.50.116.178]
  9  160 ms    171 ms    160 ms     so-1-3-0-0.pabr3.global-gateway.net.nz [202.37.245.230]
 10  160 ms    161 ms    170 ms     pao1-br1-g2-1-101.gnaps.net [198.32.176.165]
 11  180 ms    181 ms    180 ms     lax1-br1-p2-1.gnaps.net [199.232.44.5]
 12  170 ms    170 ms    171 ms     lax1-br1-ge-0-1-0.gnaps.net [199.232.44.50]
 13  240 ms    241 ms    240 ms     nyc-n20-ge2-2-0.gnaps.net [199.232.44.21]
 14  240 ms    251 ms    250 ms     ash-n20-ge1-0-0.gnaps.net [199.232.131.36]
 15  241 ms    240 ms    250 ms     0503.ge-0-0-0.gbr1.ash.nac.net [207.99.39.157]
 16  251 ms    260 ms    250 ms     0.so-2-2-0.gbr2.nwr.nac.net [209.123.11.29]
 17  250 ms    260 ms    261 ms     0.so-0-3-0.gbr1.oct.nac.net [209.123.11.233]
 18  250 ms    260 ms    261 ms     209.123.182.243
 19  250 ms    260 ms    261 ms     sol.yourhost.co.nz [66.246.3.197]

Trace complete.
C:\>
```




PORT SCANNING TECHNIQUES

TCP Port Scanning




- It is a technique to detect which TCP enabled services are running/listening on the target host
- Based on the Three-Way-Handshake and TCP Flags
 - SYN, FIN, URG, PSH, RST, ACK
- A port can be:
 - Open
 - Closed
 - Filtered


TCP Connect Scan – Open Port




TCP Connect Scan – Closed Port



TCP Connect Scan – Filtered Port




TCP SYN Scan – Open Port




TCP FIN Scan



CLOSED




OPEN | FILTERED




TCP XMAS Scan



CLOSED




OPEN | FILTERED




TCP ACK Scan



UNFILTERED
Stateless Inspection or
No Firewall



FILTERED
Stateful Inspection



UDP Port Scanning




- It is a technique to detect which UDP enabled services are running/listening on the target host
- UDP is a connectionless protocol, hence there is no Three-Way-Handshake and no flags
- The protocol is not responsible to indicate whether a connection has been established. This is the job of upper layer protocols
- Therefore we don't detect open ports but closed ones
- We can also use application protocols to find open ports


UDP Scan – Regular





CLOSED



OPEN | FILTERED



UDP Scan – Protocol Specific





IDLE SCANNING

What is it?



- The most stealthy scan technique so far...
 - The attacker never sends traffic to the target using his/her real IP address, but instead..
 - “Instructs” a victim machine (zombie) to do it for him/her
 - If a security administrator or an IPS takes action against the “attacker”, it is the poor zombie who will take the blame (blacklisted or reported to the authorities)
 - The scan traverses the target’s firewall based on the rules that apply for the zombie host (not the attacker’s host)



➤ In order for the scan to work properly:

- The zombie must generate incremental IP IDs globally (not per session/host)
- The zombie must accept TCP SYN/ACK packets (no stateful filtering for incoming packets)
- The zombie must be idle (no traffic generated)
- The attacker must be able to spoof his IP address (no NATing)
- The attacker must be able to send TCP SYN/ACK packets (no stateful filtering on his end, for outgoing packets)

IP Header




IP Header Format

Offsets	Octet	0								1								2								3							
Octet	Bit	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31
0	0	Version				IHL				DSCP				ECN				Total Length															
4	32	Identification															Flags				Fragment Offset												
8	64	Time To Live								Protocol								Header Checksum															
12	96	Source IP Address																															
16	128	Destination IP Address																															
20	160	Options (if IHL > 5)																															


TCP Behavior




Unexpected packet
that doesn't belong to
any session



Unexpected
packet with no
associated SYN




Packet that
immediately
terminates a
connection






- The basic TCP rule illustrated above is:
- Most TCP packets (e.g. SYN, FIN, ACK, SYN/ACK, etc) cause the receiving host to send a reply back to the sender (e.g. SYN/ACK, FIN/ACK, RST, etc)
 - RST packets don't cause a reply to be generated


TCP Idle Scan – Open Port



TCP Idle Scan – Closed Port



A close-up photograph of a yellow metal padlock and its key. The padlock is rectangular with a circular keyhole on one side. The key is silver-colored and has a notched head. They are resting on a white computer keyboard, with several keys visible in the background.





➤ Certain things can render regular Idle Scans ineffective or hard to perform:

- Some Operating Systems randomize or set the IP ID to zero until a connection has been established (completion of 3-Way-Handshake)
- Busy/talkative zombie hosts
- Stateful firewalls placed near or installed on zombie hosts
- The Internet is moving from IPv4 to IPv6



ADVANCED IDLE SCANNING



- Not a new scanning technique but an enhancement of the existing Idle scan
- Some of the ideas implemented have been previously suggested by people on the Bugtraq mailing list but no research work was ever published or tools created (besides *hping*)
- Our research work was performed in 2009 - 2010, hence the listed examples are old but still applicable to newer Operating Systems

Overcoming Obstacle 1



➤ Obstacle

- Some Operating Systems randomize or set the IP ID to zero until a connection has been established (completion of 3-Way-Handshake)

➤ Observation

- Popular tools send SYN/ACK packets to zombies. This is a clever trick which serves two purposes:
 - to check for incremental IP IDs
 - to check if there is a stateful firewall protecting the zombie

Overcoming Obstacle 1



➤ Solution 1

- Why only use SYN/ACK packets? We should test different TCP Flags and check if any of them cause the zombie machine to reply with incremental IP IDs

➤ Solution 2

- Since the IP ID field is part of the IP and not the TCP header, we can use other Layer 4 protocols (TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc) to check for incremental IP IDs

IP IDentifier Tool



Usage: identifier.py [options] target

Options:

- h, --help show this help message and exit
- T TCP use TCP scan mode with one or more of the following flags
S=Syn, A=Ack, F=Fin, X=Xmas, N=Null
- U use UDP scan mode
- I ICMP use ICMP scan mode P=Ping (default) T=Timestamp
A=Address Mask
- P use IP Protocol scan mode
- t TCP_PORT TCP port to use for scanning
- u UDP_PORT UDP port to use for scanning
- p IP_PROTO IP protocol number to use for scanning
- ttl=TTL how many hops the packet will traverse
- tracert detect IPID for every hop in the path
- max_hops=MAX_HOPS terminate traceroute at hop N. (use with --tracert only)
- max_noresp=MAX_NORESP terminate traceroute after N unresponsive hops.
(use with --tracert only)
- c PACKET_COUNT number of packets to send

Open Port 23/tcp



```
# ./identifier.py -TSAFXN -t23 -c3 172.16.1.17
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP SYN: ip=172.16.1.17 id=9899 inc=0

TCP SYN: ip=172.16.1.17 id=59880 inc=49981

TCP SYN: ip=172.16.1.17 id=64964 inc=5084

TCP SYN/ACK: No Response

TCP SYN/ACK: No Response

TCP SYN/ACK: No Response

TCP ACK: ip=172.16.1.17 id=37149 inc=0

TCP ACK: ip=172.16.1.17 id=40149 inc=3000

TCP ACK: ip=172.16.1.17 id=50986 inc=10837

TCP FIN: No Response

TCP XMAS: No Response

TCP NULL: No Response

Closed Port 80/tcp



```
#!/identifier.py -TSAFXN -t80 -c3 172.16.1.17
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP SYN: ip=172.16.1.17 id=38072 inc=0

TCP SYN: ip=172.16.1.17 id=38073 inc=1

TCP SYN: ip=172.16.1.17 id=38074 inc=1

TCP SYN/ACK: ip=172.16.1.17 id=38075 inc=0

TCP SYN/ACK: ip=172.16.1.17 id=38076 inc=1

TCP SYN/ACK: ip=172.16.1.17 id=38079 inc=3

TCP ACK: ip=172.16.1.17 id=38080 inc=0

TCP ACK: ip=172.16.1.17 id=38082 inc=2

TCP ACK: ip=172.16.1.17 id=38084 inc=2

TCP FIN: No Response

TCP XMAS: No Response

TCP NULL: No Response

Open Port 137/udp



```
# unicornscan -mU 192.168.10.9
```

```
UDP open          netbios-ns[ 137]    from 192.168.10.9 ttl 128
```

```
# ./identifier.py -U -u137 -c5 192.168.10.9
```

```
Scan process initiated...
```

```
UDP Scan: No Response
```

```
UDP Scan: No Response
```

```
UDP Scan: No Response
```

```
UDP Scan: No Response
```

```
UDP Scan: No Response
```

```
-----
```

Open Port 137/udp (w/ payload)



```
# hping2 192.168.10.9 --udp -p 137 -c 5 -r -d 50 --file ../137.txt
```

```
HPING 192.168.10.9 (eth0 192.168.10.9): udp mode set, 28 headers + 50 data bytes
```

```
[main] memlockall(): Success
```

```
Warning: can't disable memory paging!
```

```
len=293 ip=192.168.10.9 ttl=128 id=925 seq=0 rtt=0.4 ms
```

```
len=293 ip=192.168.10.9 ttl=128 id=+1 seq=1 rtt=0.3 ms
```

```
len=293 ip=192.168.10.9 ttl=128 id=+1 seq=2 rtt=0.4 ms
```

```
len=293 ip=192.168.10.9 ttl=128 id=+1 seq=3 rtt=0.4 ms
```

```
len=293 ip=192.168.10.9 ttl=128 id=+1 seq=4 rtt=0.4 ms
```

```
12:20:19.933615 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 58360, offset 0, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 78)
  192.168.10.3.4115 > 192.168.10.9.137: NBT UDP PACKET(137): QUERY; REQUEST; BROADCAST
12:20:19.934388 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 925, offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 185)
  192.168.10.9.137 > 192.168.10.3.4115: NBT UDP PACKET(137): QUERY; POSITIVE; RESPONSE;
12:20:22.001809 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 30695, offset 0, flags [none], proto UDP (17), length 78)
  192.168.10.3.34471 > 192.168.10.9.137: NBT UDP PACKET(137): QUERY; REQUEST; BROADCAST
12:20:22.002602 IP (tos 0x0, ttl 128, id 926, offset 0, flags [DF], proto UDP (17), length 185)
  192.168.10.9.137 > 192.168.10.3.34471: NBT UDP PACKET(137): QUERY; POSITIVE; RESPONSE;
```

Closed Port 4444/udp



```
# nmap -n -sU -p4444 192.168.10.9 -reason
```

Starting Nmap 5.00 (<http://nmap.org>) at 2010-05-31 20:01 EEST

Interesting ports on 192.168.10.9:

PORT	STATE	SERVICE	REASON
4444/udp	closed	krb524	port-unreach

```
# ./identifier.py -U -u4444 -c5 192.168.10.9
```

Scan process initiated...

UDP Scan:	ip=192.168.10.9	id=5272	inc=0	(ICMP_Unreachable)
UDP Scan:	ip=192.168.10.9	id=5273	inc=1	(ICMP_Unreachable)
UDP Scan:	ip=192.168.10.9	id=5274	inc=1	(ICMP_Unreachable)
UDP Scan:	ip=192.168.10.9	id=5275	inc=1	(ICMP_Unreachable)
UDP Scan:	ip=192.168.10.9	id=5276	inc=1	(ICMP_Unreachable)

ICMP Requests & Replies



```
# ./identifier.py -IPAT -c3 10.10.10.200
```

Scan process initiated...

ICMP Ping: ip=10.10.10.200 id=5432 inc=0

ICMP Ping: ip=10.10.10.200 id=63756 inc=58324

ICMP Ping: ip=10.10.10.200 id=50910 inc=-12846

ICMP Timestamp: ip=10.10.10.200 id=62973 inc=0

ICMP Timestamp: ip=10.10.10.200 id=29249 inc=-33724

ICMP Timestamp: ip=10.10.10.200 id=23274 inc=-5975

ICMP Address Mask: No Response

ICMP Address Mask: No Response

ICMP Address Mask: No Response

ICMP TimeX Messages



```
# ./identifier.py -TSA -c3 10.20.20.147 -ttl=1
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP SYN: ip=10.10.10.200	id=33093	inc=0	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
--------------------------	----------	-------	---------------------

TCP SYN: ip=10.10.10.200	id=33106	inc=13	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
--------------------------	----------	--------	---------------------

TCP SYN: ip=10.10.10.200	id=33113	inc=7	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
--------------------------	----------	-------	---------------------

TCP SYN/ACK: ip=10.10.10.200	id=33116	inc=0	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
------------------------------	----------	-------	---------------------

TCP SYN/ACK: ip=10.10.10.200	id=33118	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
------------------------------	----------	-------	---------------------

TCP SYN/ACK: ip=10.10.10.200	id=33124	inc=6	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
------------------------------	----------	-------	---------------------

TCP ACK: ip=10.10.10.200	id=33129	inc=0	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
--------------------------	----------	-------	---------------------

TCP ACK: ip=10.10.10.200	id=33132	inc=3	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
--------------------------	----------	-------	---------------------

TCP ACK: ip=10.10.10.200	id=33139	inc=7	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
--------------------------	----------	-------	---------------------

Tracing the whole path to a host



```
#./identifier.py -TS -t80 194.42.1.1 -c3 --tracert
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP SYN 1: No Response

TCP SYN 1: No Response

TCP SYN 1: No Response

TCP SYN 2: ip=91.184.192.49 id=55793 inc=0 (ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

TCP SYN 2: ip=91.184.192.49 id=55797 inc=4 (ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

TCP SYN 2: ip=91.184.192.49 id=55800 inc=3 (ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

TCP SYN 3: ip=91.184.192.180 id=16742 inc=0 (ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

TCP SYN 3: ip=91.184.192.180 id=16747 inc=5 (ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

TCP SYN 3: ip=91.184.192.180 id=16752 inc=5 (ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

TCP SYN 4: ip=91.184.192.163 id=39391 inc=0 (ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

TCP SYN 4: ip=91.184.192.163 id=39392 inc=1 (ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

TCP SYN 4: ip=91.184.192.163 id=39393 inc=1 (ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

...snip...

Tracing the whole path (Cont'd)



...snip...


TCP SYN 5:	ip=193.22.30.53	id=60650	inc=0	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN 5:	ip=193.22.30.53	id=60651	inc=1	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN 5:	ip=193.22.30.53	id=60652	inc=1	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

TCP SYN 6:	ip=82.116.192.17	id=39113	inc=0	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN 6:	ip=82.116.192.17	id=39114	inc=1	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN 6:	ip=82.116.192.17	id=39116	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)


TCP SYN 7:	ip=82.116.192.98	id=32316	inc=0	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN 7:	ip=82.116.192.98	id=32317	inc=1	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN 7:	ip=82.116.192.98	id=32318	inc=1	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

TCP SYN 8:	ip=194.42.1.1	id=25476	inc=0	
TCP SYN 8:	ip=194.42.1.1	id=25482	inc=6	
TCP SYN 8:	ip=194.42.1.1	id=25487	inc=5	


TCP (ACK) Idle Scan



ICMP Idle Scan



UDP Idle Scan



Overcoming Obstacle 2



➤ Obstacle

- Busy zombie machines cannot be utilized because extraneous traffic will increment the IP ID and mess-up our scan results

➤ Solution

- Send a burst of packets and observe if there is a comparative increase in the IP ID sequence

Regular Idle Scan - NMAP



```
# nmap -vv -n -PN -sI 10.10.10.253:80 10.10.10.200 -p23 --packet-trace
```

Starting Nmap 4.60 (<http://nmap.org>) at 2014-09-23 14:47 GMT

Initiating ARP Ping Scan at 14:47

Scanning 10.10.10.200 [1 port]

Completed ARP Ping Scan at 14:47, 0.01s elapsed (1 total hosts)

Initiating idle scan against 10.10.10.200 at 14:47

Interesting ports on 10.10.10.200:

PORT	STATE	SERVICE
23/tcp	open	telnet

...snip...

SENT (0.7200s) TCP 10.50.12.44:63957 > 10.10.10.253:80 SA ttl=42 id=37634 iplen=44 seq=1663218960

RCVD (0.7200s) TCP 10.10.10.253:80 > 10.50.12.44:63957 R ttl=64 id=33865 iplen=40 seq=4101936255

SENT (0.7200s) TCP 10.10.10.253:80 > 10.10.10.200:23 S ttl=43 id=13887 iplen=44 seq=3990003447

SENT (0.7760s) TCP 10.50.12.44:63918 > 10.10.10.253:80 SA ttl=43 id=30888 iplen=44 seq=1663219460

RCVD (0.7760s) TCP 10.10.10.253:80 > 10.50.12.44:63918 R ttl=64 id=33867 iplen=40 seq=4101936255

...snip...

Puppeteer Idle Scanner



Usage: puppeteer.py [options] target:port

Options:

- h, --help show this help message and exit
- z ZOMBIE IP address of zombie host (mandatory)
- T TCP use TCP to communicate with the zombie. Available flags
S/A/F/U/P/R
- U use UDP to communicate with the zombie
- I ICMP use ICMP to communicate with the zombie P=Ping (default)
T=Timestamp A=Address Mask
- P use IP Protocol to communicate with the zombie
- t TCP_PORT TCP port to use when communicating with the zombie
- u UDP_PORT UDP port to use when communicating with the zombie
- p IP_PROTO IP protocol number to use when communicating with the zombie
- ttl=TTL how many hops the packet will traverse
- c PACKET_COUNT number of packets to send to zombie host
- b BURST number of packets to send to the target as a quick burst
- fast send zombie probes faster than 1pps

Regular Idle Scan - Puppeteer



```
# ./puppeteer.py -z 10.10.10.253 -TS -t80 -c10 -b1 10.10.10.200:23
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=30231 inc=0

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=30232 inc=1

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=30233 inc=1

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=30234 inc=1

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=30235 inc=1

TCP: sending 1 spoofed packet(s)...

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=30237 inc=2

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=30238 inc=1

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=30239 inc=1

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=30240 inc=1

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=30241 inc=1

Regular Idle Scan - Busy Zombie



```
# ./puppeteer.py -z 10.10.10.253 -TS -t80 -c10 -b1 10.10.10.200:23
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=36532 inc=0

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=36539 inc=7

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=36545 inc=6

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=36551 inc=6

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=36558 inc=7

TCP: sending 1 spoofed packet(s)...

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=36565 inc=7

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=36571 inc=6

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=36577 inc=6

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=36584 inc=7

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=36590 inc=6

Busy Zombie vs Burst of Packet



```
# ./puppeteer.py -z 10.10.10.253 -TS -t80 -c10 -b5 10.10.10.200:23
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=33493 inc=0

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=33499 inc=6

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=33505 inc=6

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=33512 inc=7

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=33518 inc=6

TCP: sending 5 spoofed packet(s)...

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=33529 inc=11

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=33535 inc=6

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=33542 inc=7

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=33548 inc=6

TCP: ip=10.10.10.253 id=33554 inc=6

Overcoming Obstacle 3




➤ Obstacle

- Stateful firewalls are placed on the perimeter of a network or on the OSES, and as a result they render good zombie candidates useless to us

➤ Solution

- To solve this problem we can utilize idle or moderately busy routers as our zombies, which are less likely to be protected by stateful firewalls
- And with routers we can use ICMP Time Exceeded messages that are more likely to carry incremental IP IDs

ICMP TimeX Idle Scan



ICMP TimeX Idle Scan – Open Port



```
# ./puppeteer.py -c16 -TS -b10 --ttl=5 -z 194.42.1.1 78.158.146.182:80
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=56987	inc=0	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=56989	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=56990	inc=1	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=56992	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=56995	inc=3	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=56997	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57003	inc=6	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57005	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: sending 10 spoofed packet(s)...			
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57017	inc=12	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57021	inc=4	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57026	inc=5	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57028	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57031	inc=3	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57033	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57035	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57037	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

ICMP TimeX Idle Scan – Closed Port



```
# ./puppeteer.py -c16 -TS -b10 --ttl=5 -z 194.42.1.1 78.158.146.182:4444
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57424	inc=0	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57425	inc=1	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57427	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57429	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57430	inc=1	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57433	inc=3	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57435	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57438	inc=3	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: sending 10 spoofed packet(s)...			
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57439	inc=1	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57441	inc=2	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57446	inc=5	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57447	inc=1	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57450	inc=3	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57451	inc=1	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57454	inc=3	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)
TCP SYN: ip=193.22.30.53	id=57489	inc=35	(ICMP_TTL_Exceeded)

Overcoming Obstacle 4



➤ Obstacle

- The Internet is moving from IPv4 to IPv6 and IPv6 is not vulnerable to IPv4 Idle Scans

➤ Solution

- IPv6 Idle Scanning is still possible (see Mathias Morbitzer's presentation at HACK.LU 2013)
- The best thing is that many of the principles discussed so far are applicable in IPv6 Idle Scanning



REVEALING TRUST RELATIONSHIPS



- Regular Idle scans expose trust relationships between the zombie and the target, but...
- An improved technique can be used to reveal permissive firewall rules for trusted 3rd party networks / IP addresses
- The technique follows the same principles as Idle Scanning but with a few changes
 - We don't "ask" the zombie to reveal open/closed ports on the target,
 - ...but instead we "ask" the target to reveal trusted IP addresses


What's Needed



➤ Prerequisites

- The target host must generate global incremental IP IDs
- At least one open/closed TCP or UDP port on the target or an ICMP responsive target
- The attacker must be able to spoof his IP address (no NATing)

Basic Concept



Target Information



Starting Nmap 5.00 (<http://nmap.org>) at 2010-03-11 23:58 EET

Interesting ports on 192.168.1.13:

PORT	STATE	SERVICE
4444/tcp	open	krb524
4445/tcp	closed	unknown
4446/tcp	filtered	unknown

#./identifier.py -TS -t 4445 -c5 192.168.1.13

Scan process initiated...

TCP SYN: ip=192.168.1.13 id=506 inc=0

TCP SYN: ip=192.168.1.13 id=507 inc=1

TCP SYN: ip=192.168.1.13 id=508 inc=1

TCP SYN: ip=192.168.1.13 id=509 inc=1

TCP SYN: ip=192.168.1.13 id=510 inc=1

Trust Revealer Tool



Usage: `revealer.py [options] target:port:protocol`

Options:

- h, --help show this help message and exit
- a SPOOFED spoofed IP address and source port to be used to bypass ACL (mandatory)
Acceptable format <IP_Address:Port>
- T TCP use TCP to gather IPIDs from the target. Available flags S/A/F/U/P/R
- U use UDP to gather IPIDs from the target
- I ICMP use ICMP to gather IPIDs from the target P=Ping (default)
T=Timestamp A=Address Mask
- P use IP Protocol to gather IPIDs from the target
- t TCP_PORT TCP port to use when gathering IPIDs from the target
- u UDP_PORT UDP port to use when gathering IPIDs from the target
- p IP_PROTO IP protocol number to use when gathering IPIDs from the target
- ttl=TTL how many hops the packet will traverse
- c PACKET_COUNT number of IPID probe packets to send to the target
- b BURST number of spoofed packets to send to the target as a quick burst
- fast send IPID probes to target faster than 1pps

Trust Revealer – Open Port



```
# ./revealer.py -TS -t4445 -a 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.13:4444:T -c10 -b5
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=541 inc=0

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=542 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=543 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=544 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=545 inc=1

TCP: sending 5 spoofed packet(s)... to port 4444

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=551 inc=6

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=552 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=553 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=554 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=555 inc=1

Trust Revealer – Closed Port



```
# ./revealer.py -TS -t4444 -a 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.13:4445:T -c10 -b5
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=556 inc=0

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=557 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=558 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=559 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=560 inc=1

TCP: sending 5 spoofed packet(s)... to port 4445

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=566 inc=6

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=567 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=568 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=569 inc=1


TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=570 inc=1

Observation




- We can only detect if a port is filtered or unfiltered, not if it's open or closed

Unfiltered Open|Closed Port



Filtered Port



(no response...)

Trusted
3rd Party



Trust Revealer – Filtered Port



```
# ./revealer.py -TS -t4445 -a 192.168.1.3 192.168.1.13:4446:T -c10 -b5
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=1861 inc=0

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=1862 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=1863 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=1864 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=1865 inc=1

TCP: sending 5 spoofed packet(s)... to port 4446

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=1866 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=1867 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=1868 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=1869 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=1870 inc=1

Trust Revealer – Filtered Port - Spoofed



```
# ./revealer.py -TS -t4445 -a 192.168.1.2 192.168.1.13:4446:T -c10 -b5
```

Scan process initiated...

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=571 inc=0

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=572 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=573 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=574 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=575 inc=1

TCP: sending 5 spoofed packet(s)... to port 4446

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=581 inc=6

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=582 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=583 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=584 inc=1

TCP: ip=192.168.1.13 id=585 inc=1



- Enhancements to current Idle Scan techniques
 - Use of different protocols (e.g. IP, TCP, UDP, ICMP)
 - Use of different TCP Flags (e.g. SYN, ACK, FIN)
 - Use of ICMP Time Exceeded messages from routers
 - Use of packets bursts
- Improved technique for identifying firewall rules that allow connections from trusted 3rd parties based on source IP addresses.



Do You Have Any Questions?

We would be happy to help.



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For: *ISACA & (ISC)² Cyprus Chapters*

Date: 25 September 2014

Download Location:

<http://www.qsecure.com.cy/whitepapers.html>